We are plunging toward a dark and dangerous winter. A third wave of Covid-19 infections is surging around the world. At this writing, U.S. Covid cases are increasing at a rate of more than 100,000 new infections per day. One thousand Americans are dying from the virus each day. The health care facilities of nearly every state are being overwhelmed by Covid caseloads.
It is a sad fact that all this
could have been avoided.
If more state governments had
been responsible and closed the bars, restaurants, gyms, and political rallies that
act like petri dishes for the virus’s growth, Covid’s impact could have been
mitigated. But too many politicians bent to the pressure placed on them by both
small businesses and corporations to avoid such lockdowns. Even in states like
California, where a lockdown did start to contain the virus, politicians
eventually caved and lifted restrictions too early and too quickly.
We’ve seen this same
profit-at-any-price mentality in this country before when another scourge
threatened American lives, and businesses refused to adapt to the situation to
save lives. The last time we saw this kind of thinking, we nearly lost WWII.
Operation Drumbeat
Within weeks of declaring war on
the United States, Adolf Hitler launched a U-boat offensive against the
American East Coast called Operation Paukenschlag (Operation Drumbeat). On
January 14, 1942, the first German sub arrived off the coast of Rhode Island,
soon followed by four more. The German sailors were delighted to find tankers
and freighters sailing alone without escort. Even more surprising, they found
the coast brightly lit by shore lights that provided U-boats with perfectly
silhouetted targets.
Blackouts are a necessity of war.
Across the Atlantic, blackouts were imposed on every English, French, and
German shoreline. Even before entering the war, American military officials
realized the potential need for blacking out the Eastern seaboard at night. But
local chambers of commerce, fearing a loss of profits, fought every attempt to
impose a coastal blackout.
The result was devastating.
In just weeks, those first five
U-boats sank 16 ships totaling 104,761 tons. Allied logistics experts estimated
the loss in ships, cannon, vehicles, and fuel was equivalent to the damage
caused by 30,000 German aerial bombing sorties. And it was just the beginning.
Like the coronavirus, the U-boat
onslaught came in waves. The first wave may have come as a surprise—though it
shouldn’t have—but there was no excuse to not be prepared for the following
waves. But, just as with the Covid crisis today, America remained unresponsive
to the threat
The blame can’t be laid entirely
at the feet of East Coast business interests—though they fought
tooth-and-against blacking out shoreline enterprises. Just as with the Covid
crisis, there was ineptitude at high levels of government where bureaucrats
would not accept the reality of a U-boat threat in American waters.
The Anglophobe Admiral
Admiral Ernest King, chief of naval operations, was an Anglophobe. A British official described King as “intolerant and suspicious of all things British, especially the Royal Navy.” Before America entered the war, King rejected all calls for preparing for a U-boat attack on the United States, refusing to believe Germany had such a capability despite the fact U-boats had operated in American waters in WWI.
Merchant ship Dixie Arrow torpedoed off Cape Hatteras by U-71, 26 March 1942. |
Like Donald Trump’s refusal to
accept the reality of the Covid crisis, King refused to acknowledge the threat
facing merchant ships sailing in American waters or his own failure to protect
them. Even after the first German submarine onslaught, King’s Anglophobia made
him resist implementing any of the hard-won lessons the English learned about
fighting U-boats in three years of war. He adamantly refused to adopt a convoy
system to protect Allied shipping as the British had despite the fact that convoys—groups
of merchant ships protected by sub-hunting ships and patrol boats—was used by
the American Navy in WWI. King’s attitude, and that of many of his
subordinates, was summed up by U.S. Rear Adm. R. S. Edwards. “Americans must
learn by their own mistakes,” he told a British colleague, “and we have plenty
of ships.”
In fact, we did not have plenty
of ships.
By mid-March, the loss of oil
tankers was so great that the Petroleum Industry War Council warned the U.S.
would run out of oil in six months. By June 1942, Army Chief of Staff George C.
Marshall worried “that another month or two of this . . . [and] . . . we will
be unable to bring sufficient men and planes to bear against the enemy . . .”
The danger to the war effort
posed by King's ethnocentrism prompted General Dwight D. Eisenhower to write, “One
thing that might help win this war is to shoot King.”
To the British, the Battle of the
Western Atlantic was a “holocaust.”
A convoy system wouldn’t be organized
until mid-1942, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered King to implement
one.
And still the lights shone
In February 1942, FDR issued an
executive order giving the military authority to order coastal blackouts. Once
again, seashore businesses pushed back, and the military hesitated to implement
the order. Admiral King sent the coastal defense commander a “request” to
implement a “dimout” of shore lights, but he still refused to call for a full
blackout.
U-boats victories mounted as did
merchant ship losses. For the tourists and party clubbers enjoying the well-lit
coastal nightlife, the war came home the hard way. At night, they could see torpedoed
ships burning offshore. In the mornings, those same fun lovers found the
scorched bodies of merchant sailors that had washed ashore. Eventually, coastline
businesses began to lose money simply because people did not want to be that
close to the reality of war. And still, they refused to execute blackouts until
much later in the year.
By then the damage was done. In
the first six months of 1942, nearly 400 Allied merchantmen were sunk in
American waters at a cost to Germany of only six U-boats. Unlike Pearl Harbor,
none of the ships were salvageable. No one was ever held responsible for these
terrible losses. It would still take until the first half of 1943 before
American anti-submarine warfare capabilities caught up with those of Britain
and Canada.
(New York Times) |
In his book Operation Drumbeat, author Michael Gannon concludes, “Civilian avarice and carelessness must take their places on the list of agents accountable for the U-boat triumphs.” When the history of America’s war against Covid-19 is written, what will the historians say of us?